Journal of Business & Technology Law
Volume 17

Issue 1

Article 2

An Investigation of when the Antitrust Agencies are likely to
challenge a Pay-for-Delay Settlement under ACTAVIS
Thomas Y. Lu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jbtl
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons

Recommended Citation
Thomas Y. Lu, An Investigation of when the Antitrust Agencies are likely to challenge a Pay-for-Delay
Settlement under ACTAVIS, 17 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 1 (2022)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jbtl/vol17/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Business & Technology Law by an authorized editor of
DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

Lu (Do Not Delete)

8/8/2022 1:59 AM

An Investigation of when the Antitrust Agencies are
likely to Challenge a Pay-For-Delay Settlement
under ACTAVIS
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Abstract

In FTC v. Actavis, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a large, unjustified reverse
payment in a pay-for-delay settlement might be classed as anticompetitive.
However, neither the courts nor academia have clearly defined what a “large and
unjustified” reverse payment entails. Thus, it is difficult to predict when a given payfor-delay settlement might be challenged by the antitrust agencies. To establish a
better prediction, this paper used machine learning to develop two decision tree
models based on numerical and categorical data. The former model considers the
duration of the generic drug delay entering the market and the estimated reverse
payment, while the latter regards the status of the generic entry and the scale of
the estimated reverse payment. Using the results of the decision tree models, a
payment should be deemed large and unjustified if the estimated reverse payments
for pay-for-delay settlements based on generic entry status to delay the entry of
generic drugs exceed USD $24 million (2021). Pharmaceutical companies can use
the results of the decision trees to predict whether past or future pay-for-delay
settlements will be classified as large and unjustified thereby lowering the risks of
being challenged from antitrust agencies.
Keywords: Reverse Payment, Pay-for-delay settlement, Antitrust Agencies,
Machine Learning, Decision Tree
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Introduction
1

In the 2013 case FTC v. Actavis, the U.S. Supreme Court made five key judgments
about how lower courts should analyze pay-for-delay agreements2 from an antitrust
perspective.3 First, pay-for-delay agreements between brand-name and generic
manufacturers have the “potential for genuine adverse effects on competition.”4
Second, the adverse effects on competition may be justified because the
compensation that the generic manufacturer receives could be greater than the
avoided patent litigation costs and may also cover other services that the generic
firm has promised, such as distributing or helping to develop a market for the
patented item.5 Third, the size of the payment may also reflect the brand-name
company’s market power because firms with significant market influence can
charge higher than competitive prices.6 Fourth, an unexplained large reverse
payment normally suggests that the patentee has serious doubts about the patent’s
survival.7 Furthermore, it is normally unnecessary to litigate a patent’s validity to
determine whether a pay-for-delay settlement is injurious to competition.8 Fifth,
the fact that a large, unjustified reverse payment risks violating antitrust laws does
not prevent the litigants from settling a suit.9 Thus, the purpose of the settlement
plays a key role in its analysis. Courts should invalidate agreements that maintain
and divide patent-generated monopoly profits between the brand-name and
generic manufacturers without a sufficient justification.10
In Actavis, the justices used the terms “unexplained large reverse payment” and
“large, unjustified reverse payment” to describe pay-for-delay agreements that
might be anticompetitive.11 However, they failed to clarify exactly how large such

1.

FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013).
A pay-for-delay agreement is generally a form of patent dispute settlement where a pharmaceutical
patent holder extends to a generic company some sort of value transfer, for instance direct monetary payment,
distribution or licensing rights and/or other forms of considerations in return for which the generic company
acknowledges the validity of the patent in dispute and undertakes to refrain from marketing a generic version
of drugs which is equivalent to the originator drugs for a specified period of time at the end of the life of the
patent. The consideration in return for the delay of the generic drug in above situation is also called reverse
payment.
Tay
and
Partners,
The
Notorious
“Pay-for-Delay”
Agreement,
LEXOLOGY,
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=eacd6026-39c5-4c49-8b66-47ba05eedf8c
(last
visited
November 1, 2021).
3. Actavis, Inc., 113 U.S. at 141.
4. Id. at 153 (citing FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U. S. 447, 460-61 (1986)).
5. Id. at 156.
6. Id. at 157.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 158.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 157-58.
2.
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payments are or how their size should be determined. Instead, they only laid down
the factors to be considered when determining whether payments might be
anticompetitive, such as the avoided litigation cost and other services that are
included in the payment.12 Thus, pharmaceutical companies have difficulty
predicting whether their past and future pay-for-delay settlements might be
challenged by the antitrust agencies. 13
This paper aims to provide a clear, standardized method by which the antitrust
agencies are likely to challenge a pay-for-delay settlement under Actavis by
evaluating which sizes of reverse payments would be classified as large and
unjustified and in which situations pharmaceutical manufacturers could
significantly risk being challenged by antitrust agencies. In Part II, we explore how
the lower courts, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and other scholars have
dealt with and determined whether their research can provide any useful indicators
for how to define large and unjustified payments. In Part III, we discuss our
assumptions, data collected from different sources, and associated challenges. For
this, we collate 162 available abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) patent
litigation settlements and categorize them into numerical and categorical data. In
Part IV, we use these two categories to develop decision trees while applying the
Gini Index and Entropy criteria. In Part V, we address the implications of our results
to answer our research question and make proposals for pharmaceutical
manufacturers about how to use the results of our decision trees to avoid antitrustassociated risk when making pay-for-delay settlements. Part VI concludes our
findings and acknowledges the limitations of this paper.
I. PRECEDENTS AFTER ACTAVIS AND LITERATURE DISCUSSIONS

As mentioned above, in Actavis, the justices failed to clarify exactly how large
such payments are or how their size should be determined. 14 However, this has not
stopped courts from applying language from Actavis to render their decisions.15
According to our survey, from 2014 to 2019 (See Appendix), after Actavis, judges
used two methods to analyze pay-for-delay settlements under Actavis guidelines.16
12.

Id. at 159.
Valeria Bauman, Pharma Pay-For-Delay Deals Called ‘Cost of Doing Business’, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 10,
2020,
5:30
A.M.),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/pharma-and-life-sciences/pharma-pay-for-delaysettlements-cost-of-doing-business.
14. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 159 (2013).
15. See e.g. In re Zetia (Ezetimibe) Antitrust Litig., No. 2:18-md-2836, 2019 WL 1397228, at *12 (E.D. Va.
Feb. 6, 2019) (citing Actavis, 113 U.S. at 157) (applying Actavis and reasoning that “‘[a]n unexplained large
reverse payment itself would normally suggest that the patentee has serious doubts about the patent’s
survival.’ If so, then its objective may be ‘to maintain supra-competitive prices to be shared among the patentee
and the challenger.’ Such ‘large and unjustified’ reverse payments raise antitrust concerns and subject the
agreement to scrutiny for antitrust harms.”).
16. See infra App’x pp. 34-35.
13.
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The first directly applies the language from Actavis to a given case.17 That is, the
courts have attempted to interpret the meaning of “large, unjustified reverse
payment,” with the majority interpreting it literally. 18 For instance, in In re Loestrin
24 Fe Antitrust Litigation19, the judge required that the plaintiffs plead information
sufficient “to estimate the value of the term, at least to the extent of determining
whether it is ‘large’ and ‘unjustified.’” 20 In the recent In re Zetia (Ezetimibe) Antitrust
Litigation, the court explained that such large and unjustified reverse payments
raise antitrust concerns and make their underlying agreements vulnerable to
antitrust scrutiny.21 The second method addresses the elements that plaintiffs must
prove are present in a pay-for-delay agreement.22 For instance, in In re Cipro Cases
I & II23, the court stated:
A third-party plaintiff challenging a reverse-payment patent settlement must
show four elements: (a) the settlement includes a limit on the settling generic
challenger’s entry into the market; (b) the settlement includes cash or equivalent
financial consideration flowing from the brand to the generic challenger; and the
consideration exceeds (c) the value of goods and services other than any delay in
market entry provided by the generic challenger to the brand, as well as (d) the
brand’s expected remaining litigation costs absent settlement. 24
Although this approach has not been widely adopted by other courts, it
represents a first step in attempting to resolve this complex issue. However, neither
of these methods clearly defines the factors that make payments large and
unjustified. For example, they fail to clarify whether all payments that are larger
than future litigation costs are unjustified. Therefore, if several pay-for-delay
settlements have payments that are larger than future litigation costs,
pharmaceutical manufacturers can hardly predict whether those settlements are
likely to be challenged by antitrust agencies.25
Furthermore, we also found that the FTC has not provided any guidelines to
decide whether a payment in a pay-for-delay agreement can be classified as large

17.

See infra App’x pp. 34-35.
See infra App’x pp. 34-35.
19. Rochester Drug Co-Operative, Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Co. (In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig.),
814 F.3d 538 (1st Cir. 2016).
20. Id. at 552 (quoting In re Actos End Payor Antitrust Litig., No. 13–CV–9244 (RA), 2015 WL 5610752, at
*13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2015)).
21. In re Zetia (Ezetimibe) Antitrust Litig., 400 F. Supp. 3d 418, 425 (E.D. Va. 2019) (citing FTC v. Actavis,
Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 159 (2013)).
22. See infra App’x pp. 34-35.
23. In re Cipro Cases I & II, 348 P.3d 865 (2015).
24. Id. at 865.
25. See supra text accompanying note 13.
18.
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and unjustified.26 The FTC is able to access and publish data from settlements
between brand-name and generic manufacturers because the 2003 Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act requires manufacturers to
report their patent litigation settlements to the FTC.27 The FTC’s 2016 report
analyzing settlement data shows that 30 final settlements contained both explicit
compensation from a brand-name manufacturer to a generic manufacturer and a
restriction on the generic manufacturer’s ability to market its products
competitively against the brand-name manufacturer’s products.28 Most notably, 29
of these 30 agreements contained payments for avoided litigation from the brandname manufacturer to the generic manufacturer of $250,000–$7,000,000, with the
average payment standing at $2.85 million and two of the 29 payments totaling in
excess of $7 million.29
These statistics show the range of reverse settlement payments from brandname companies to generic companies. It is difficult for brand-name and generic
manufacturers, however, to determine precisely where within this range payments
become large and unjustified because, for example, a payment of $7 million may
actually be small in relation to expected litigation costs. Thus, the statistics
published by the FTC did not tell pharmaceutical manufactures the circumstances
under which a pay-for-delay settlement might be challenged.30
As of the commentary after Actavis, Former FTC Commissioner Joshua D. Wright
proposed to answer the central question of this paper regarding whether reverse
payments greater than avoided litigation costs are large and unjustified. 31 Wright’s
answer addressed two approaches to this issue. One approach was proposed by
Edlin et al. (2013) in their article titled Activating Actavis, which states that the
amount of the reverse payment should be less than the avoided litigation costs, and
that other considerations provided by the claimed infringer to the patentee can
reflect the strength of a patent and can be understood as a payment for delaying

26. We found that the FTC only provides the basic statistics of settlements between the generic and the
brand drug manufacturers.
27. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108–173 § 1112,
117 Stat. 2461 (2003) (requiring that brand-name drug manufacturers, generic drug applicants, and biosimilar
biological product applicants file certain agreements with the FTC and the Department of Justice within 10
business days of executing agreements.).
28. Bureau of Competition, Agreements Filed with the Federal Trade Commission under the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003: Overview of Agreements Filed in FY 2016, FTC,
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/agreements-filled-federal-trade-commission-undermedicare-prescription-drug-improvement/mma_report_fy2016.pdf(last visited Sep. 3, 2021).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Joshua D. Wright, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Analysis of Reverse Payment Settlements
after Actavis: Three Questions and Proposed Answers—Remarks at the Antitrust Masters Course VII (Oct. 10,
2014) (transcript available on the Federal Trade Commission website).
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entry.32 The theory underlying this approach is based on the monopoly-to-duopoly
model that assumes entry by a single generic manufacturer. 33 The brand-name
manufacturer would lose profits when a generic manufacturer enters the market,
and the avoided litigation costs are based on this monopoly-to-duopoly model.34
A different approach was proposed by Harris et al. (2014) in a response to
Activating Actavis titled Activating Actavis: A More Complete Story. The authors
argued that the avoided litigation costs do not reflect the benefits of settlements to
consumers because settlements sometimes occur before patents expire. 35 As a
result, incorporating avoided litigation costs into the determination of large and
unjustified payments would reduce the number of settlements that benefit
consumers.36
Ultimately, Wright seemed to favor the second approach, arguing that avoided
litigation costs should not be included in the determination because the monopolyto-duopoly model does not reflect the institutional reality that multiple
manufacturers can enter a market after a patent is invalidated. 37 This is due to the
fact that the generic manufacturer that successfully challenges a patent’s validity
would be granted the right to be the sole entrant for only 180 days, not for the
remaining lifetime of the patent.38 The greater the number of generic entrants, the
smaller their profits.39 By accounting for possible losses due to multiple entrants,
settlements between brand-name and generic manufacturers would benefit
consumers while also exceeding avoided litigation costs.40
Other scholars have also expressed their opinions regarding Actavis. For
instance, in 2014, Herbert Hovenkamp discussed the relationship between patent
validity and pay-for-delay settlements.41 He claimed that the size of the payment
should play a key role in determining whether it is large and unjustified, as it reflects
the probability of the patent being invalidated, the value of the remaining lifetime
of the patent, and the harm it may cause to the market because of the delay of the

32. Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Activating Actavis, 28 ANTITRUST 16,
16 (2013).
33. Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391, 399 (2003).
34. Murat Mungan, Reverse Payments, Perverse Incentives, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 5 (2013); Einer Elhauge
& Alex Krueger, Solving the Patent Settlement Puzzle, 91 TEX. L. REV. 283, 298 (2012).
35. Barry C. Harris, Kevin M. Murphy, Robert D. Willig & Matthew B. Wright, Activating Actavis: A More
Complete Story, 28 ANTITRUST 83, 83 (2014).
36. Id. at 88.
37. Wright, supra note 31, at 12.
38. Id. at 12-13.
39. Id. at 14.
40. Id.
41. Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Patent Settlements and the Supreme Court’s Actavis Decision, 15
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 3, 6 (2014).

6

Journal of Business & Technology Law

Lu (Do Not Delete)

8/8/2022 1:59 AM

THOMAS Y. LU
generic entry.42 Thus, patent validity may be one of several factors that affect the
size of settlements.43 Furthermore, Hovenkamp argued that pay-for-delay
settlements are unrelated to patent validity, as they may also reflect the profitsharing that would occur between brand-name and generic manufacturers during
the 180-day exclusivity period granted to generic manufacturers who successfully
sue to invalidate brand-name manufacturers’ patents under the Hatch–Waxman
Act.44 Thus, Hovenkamp concluded that patent validity alone cannot determine
whether a pay-for-delay agreement violates antitrust laws.45
Michael A. Carrier expounded on a means for determining whether a payment
from a brand-name to a generic manufacturer constitutes an exclusion payment
that would violate antitrust laws.46 His method begins with an analysis of two
elements to ascertain whether the payment is justified.47 First, payments that do
not exceed litigation costs are not classed as exclusion payments, as the brandname manufacturer is expected to have paid these costs regardless of whether
litigation occurred.48 Second, payments can be made for services unrelated to the
generic manufacturer’s postponement of market entry. 49
After the justification analysis, two more elements are analyzed to determine
the exclusion payment.50 First, whether the brand conveys to the generic a type of
consideration unavailable as a direct consequence of winning the lawsuits is
assessed.51 Second, payments considered as a direct consequence are then
analyzed to determine whether the generic manufacturer is excluded from the
market due to the strength of the brand-name manufacturer’s patent.52 As valid
patents provide the brand-name manufacturer a right to exclude, the payment due
to the validity of the patents can be justified. 53 Nonetheless, Carrier argues that
exclusions not due to the brand-name manufacturer’s market power may violate
antitrust laws because payments would rise beyond what a valid patent could
justify.54
Instead of debating which payments would be considered large and unjustified
under Actavis, several scholars have sought to predict the real-world effects of
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 10-13.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 20-21.
Michael A. Carrier, Payment after Actavis, 100 IOWA L. REV. 7, 9 (2014).
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 26.
Michael A. Carrier, Payment after Actavis, 100 IOWA L. REV. 7, 27 (2014).
Id. at 27-28.
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Actavis.55 For example, Allison Schmitt discussed how brand-name manufacturers
have extended their exclusivity periods by using secondary patents for elements
beyond the active compound itself. 56 However, these patents are easily invalidated
by Hatch–Waxman litigation.57 Thus, if secondary patents become the main focus
of litigation for which the manufacturers settle, the application of the Hatch–
Waxman Act might encounter obstacles.58
In 2016, Feldman and Frondorf analyzed how the brand-name and the generic
manufacturers delay the release of generic drugs, suggesting that delays occur in
three stages.59 The first stage is when brand-name manufacturers simply pay
generic manufacturers to delay their entry into the market.60 The second stage is
when brand-name and generic manufacturers engage in multiple side deals to
conceal the value of settlement payments.61 These side deals may take several
forms. For instance, the settlements may feature an acceleration clause that allows
the generic manufacturer to enter the market immediately if another generic
manufacturer is also able to enter before the end of the 180-day exclusivity
period.62 Another type of deal contains a no-Authorized Generic clause that
prevents the brand-name manufacturer from launching any authorized generic
drugs in exchange for the generic manufacturer delaying its entry. 63 This clause
allows the brand-name manufacturer to continue to sell its patented drug until the
end of the 180-day exclusivity period.64 The third stage involves a variety of
techniques, one example of which is known as “product-hopping.”65 An example of
product-hopping is when AstraZeneca made its original prescription drug Prilosec
into an over-the-counter drug before introducing its newly patented prescription
drug Nexium.66 Before the patent expired, Prilosec had already become the bestselling drug in the U.S. market with over $6 billion in annual sales.67 In 2013, 12

55. Allison A. Schmitt, Competition Ahead? The Legal Landscape for Reverse Payment Settlements after
Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 493, 493-44 (2014).
56. Id. at 503.
57. Id. at 532-33.
58. Id. at 533.
59. Robin Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Drug Wars: A New Generation of Generic Pharmaceutical Delay, 53
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 499, 504-05 (2016).
60. Id. at 510.
61. Id. at 516.
62. Id. at 521.
63. Id. at 522.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 525.
66. Robin Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Drug Wars: A New Generation of Generic Pharmaceutical Delay, 53
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 499, 527 (2016).
67. Id. at 529.
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years after its launch, Nexium was the second best-selling drug in the U.S. market
with just under $6 billion in annual sales.68
Overall, the literature shows that only a small number of courts and scholars
have attempted to define precisely what constitutes large and unjustified
payments.69 However, under Actavis, large and unjustified payments are the key
factor in determining whether a pay-for-delay settlement might be challenged by
the antitrust agencies, so the lingering confusion over the issue makes it difficult for
pharmaceutical manufacturers to properly evaluate the risk of being challenged
when making pay-for-delay settlements.70 Thus, this paper endeavors to define the
types of payments that qualify as large and unjustified for antitrust agencies and
how pharmaceutical manufacturers should manage the risk that pay-for-delay
settlements will be challenged by the antitrust authorities.
II. DATA

A. Assumptions
To achieve our research goals, we first created a dataset for decision tree
models. According to the guidelines in Actavis and the literature above, the four
elements correlated to whether a settlement payment is large and unjustified are
the date of the settlement, the expiration date of the last qualifying patent, whether
generic manufacturers have already entered the market, and the size of the
settlement payment.71
Due to the difficulty in collecting data, we made four assumptions to simplify the
data-collection process. First, we took the date of the settlement as the termination
date of the ANDA patent litigation. Second, we assumed that the only factor
preventing generic manufacturers from entering the market was the patent
expiration date and that pediatric exclusivity72 would not impact the generic entry.
Third, we assumed that all the pay-for-delay settlements have cash payments and
that the amount of the payments were determined by the judges or were
determined by using the estimated reverse payment ratio based on the function of
ANDA Paragraph IV (to accelerate the entry of generic manufacturers into the
68. AstraZeneca Holds off Rivals as Drug Patent Dies, USA TODAY (Oct. 5, 2001, 1:38 PM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/general/2001-10-05-prilosec.htm.
69. See Michael A. Carrier, Payment After Actavis, 100 IOWA L. REV., 7, 7 (2014). Specifically, we only found
that Professor Carrier discussed the meaning of the large and unjustified payment under Actavis. Id.
70. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 158-59 (2013).
71. Id at 170-71.
72. The Pediatric Exclusivity Provision, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/science-research/pediatrics/pediatricexclusivity-provision (last updated Mar. 22, 2018) (“In 1997, as part of the Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act (FDAMA) (Pub. L. 105-115), Congress enacted a new law that provides marketing incentives
to manufacturers who conduct studies of drugs in children. This law, which provides six months exclusivity in
return for conducting pediatric studies, is commonly known as the pediatric exclusivity provision.”).
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market). In Actavis, the justices noted that one of the reasons why brand-name
manufacturers make reverse payments is that they believe that they might lose the
patent validity suit, thus accelerating the entry of the generic. 73 Without ANDA
Paragraph IV, generic manufacturers would have to wait until relevant patents
expire before entering the market.74 Settlements between manufacturers seem to
diminish the function of ANDA Paragraph IV. Therefore, we assumed that estimated
reverse payments were equal to the average reverse payment divided by the
decrease in U.S. brand-name manufacturer investment spending on drugs due to
patent expiration. In 2016, 75 the former was $2.85 million, and the latter was $1.4
billion,76 yielding 0.203 percent. This ratio should be different every year, but the
FTC did not disclose the mean annual reverse payment until the 2016 MMA Report
was published in 2019.77 At the time of writing, it remains impossible to calculate a
ratio for each year of analysis, so we have assumed that it was constant between
2014 and 2020.
B. Data Collection
Based on the assumptions above, we built our dataset from five types of data.
The first was ANDA patent litigation settlements made between January 1, 2014,
and August 31, 2020. Some settlements were challenged by the antitrust agencies,
and others were not. This data was found via the JD Supra website 78 (which is
targeted at business executives and in-house counsel), the Robins Kaplan LLP law
firm website,79 and a Westlaw database.

73.

Actavis, 570 U.S. at 157-58; see supra note 2.
Patent Certifications and Suitability Petitions, FDA https://www.fda.gov/drugs/abbreviated-new-drugapplication-anda/patent-certifications-and-suitability-petitions (last updated Nov. 2, 2021).
75. Overview of Agreements Filed in FY 2016, A Report by the Bureau of Competition, FTC (May 2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/agreements-filled-federal-trade-commission-undermedicare-prescription-drug-improvement/mma_report_fy2016.pdf (When we wrote this paper in the fall of
2020, the latest MMA report was released in May 2019, which contained the results of settlements from FY
2016, which I used to calculate the ratio); see supra note 28.
76. Matej Mikulic, Projected decrease in brand drug spending due to patent loss in the U.S. 2014-2024,
STATISTA (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/886733/decrease-in-drug-spending-due-to-loss-ofexclusivity-us/.
77. Overview of Agreements Filed in FY 2016, A Report by the Bureau of Competition, FTC (May 2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/agreements-filled-federal-trade-commission-undermedicare-prescription-drug-improvement/mma_report_fy2016.pdf.
78. See Jeffrey Alan Hovden, Oren Langer, Kelsey McElveen & Christopher Pinahs, ANDA Litigations
Settlements – Spring 2020, JDSupra (May 3, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/anda-litigationsettlements-spring-2020-73758/ (providing a list of ANDA patent settlements that occurred in spring 2020).
79. See
ANDA
Litigation
Settlements
Winter
2019,
Robins
Kaplan
LLP
(2019),
https://www.robinskaplan.com/resources/legal-updates/generically-speaking-hatch-waxmanbulletin/2019/generically-speaking-winter-2019/anda-litigation-settlements (providing the ANDA patent
settlements that occurred in the winter of 2019).
74.
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The second data set was drawn from a database compiled by the FDA on
Paragraph IV Patent Certifications made up to August 31, 2020. The database
contains the drug name, dosage form, strength, NDA, date of submission, number
of ANDAs submitted, 180-day status, 180-day decision posting date, date of first
applicant approval, date of first commercial marketing, and expiration date of the
last qualifying patent.80 We collected the date of first commercial marketing and
the expiration date of the last qualifying patent that involved the ANDA patent
litigation settlements.
The third data type concerned the availability of generic drug-related ANDA
patent litigation settlements. This data divulged that first-time generics are the first
generic versions of marketed brand-name drug products to be approved by the
FDA. The data was sourced via Drugs.com, which is the largest, most frequently
visited independent medicine information website in the world. 81
The fourth source was 10-K reports filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission by brand-name and generic manufacturers involved in the ANDA
patent litigation settlements mentioned above. The 10-K reports record the amount
of revenue a company earns for a particular drug in a given year in the U.S. market.82
This data can be used to estimate the reverse payment for a pay-for-delay
settlement.
The fifth data source was the revenue generated by a drug in a given year in the
United States. This information was drawn from various sources, such as Statista
and FiercePharma.
C. Limitations and Data Selection
Before introducing the decision tree analysis, it is necessary to describe how the
data was selected and discuss any limitations related to this data. One of the data
sources used in this work was the ANDA patent litigation settlements from January
1, 2014 to August 31, 2020. The greatest challenge with this data was finding the
specific amount of revenue generated by a particular drug each year in the U.S.
market. This data can be difficult to find because drug manufacturers may not want
to disclose the individual financial performance of each of their products.
Consequently, they sometimes combine their financial results and report global

80. See
Patent
Certifications
and
Suitability
Petitions,
FDA
(Sept.
22,
2021),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/abbreviated-new-drug-application-anda/patent-certifications-and-suitabilitypetitions (providing the latest certifications).
81. See Generic Drugs - Availability and Patent Status, Drugs.com, https://www.drugs.com/availability/
(providing a list of generic drugs and associated relevant data) (last visited Nov. 2, 2021).
82. See Merck & Co., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 121 (Dec. 31, 2019),
https://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/AnnualReportArchive/m/NYSE_MRK_2019.pdf,
(providing
Merck & Co., Inc.’s revenue streams for each of its drugs for FY 2019).
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figures instead. Therefore, we had to delete settlements from our dataset when we
could not find the amount of individual revenue generated in the U.S. market.
Settlements that included non-cash payments were also deleted. 83 In Feldman
and Frondorf’s paper, the authors demonstrated the importance of non-cash
payments to pay-for-delay settlements. However, since it is difficult to evaluate the
value of non-cash payments, settlements containing them were not included in our
dataset. Moreover, settlements were deleted from the dataset if their core issue
was not related to reverse payments, such as those concerned with patent on-sale
prohibitions or product-hopping issues. Finally, settlements for drugs that were
withdrawn from the market by the FDA after the settlement date were also
removed from the dataset.84
The final dataset contained 162 ANDA patent litigation settlements, of which 13
were adjudicated by federal judges, and 149 were not challenged by antitrust
agencies.
D. Data Categorization
Before running the decision trees, we first categorized the dataset. We
established one dependent variable and two independent variables. The dependent
variable was whether the settlement was being challenged by an antitrust agency.
Thus, settlements that were being challenged were coded as Y, and those that were
not being challenged were coded as N.
For the independent variable, the decision trees were run for two versions of the
dataset. The first version contained only numerical data. The first independent
variable was the duration between the date of settlement and the patent expiration
date for each of the drugs for which settlements were reached, or the period
between the date of settlement and a generic manufacturer’s entry into the
market. These durations were called years of delay (YoD). The YoD would be
negative if a generic manufacturer entered the market before the date of
settlement but would otherwise be positive. The second independent variable was
the estimated reverse payment for each settlement calculated using the estimated
reverse payment ratio mentioned above. These were denoted as Payments.
Another version of the dataset contained categorical data. The first independent
variable was duration, which was coded according to when the generic

83. See In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 814 F.3d 538 (2016) (depicting an instance where Actavis
Pharma, Inc. reached non-cash reverse payments).
84. See FDA Requests the Withdrawal of the Weight-loss Drug Belviq, Belviq XR (lorcaserin) From the
Market, FDA (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/fda-drug-safety-podcasts/fda-requests-withdrawalweight-loss-drug-belviq-belviq-xr-lorcaserin-market (demonstrating that the FDA requested the withdrawal of
the weight-loss drugs Belviq and Belviq XR (lorcaserin) from the market on February 13, 2020); see supra note
78 (referencing the ANDA litigation settlement of Arena Pharms., Inc., v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.).
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manufacturer entered the market. Table 1 below illustrates the categorizations and
their coding.
Table 1. Coding according to when the generic manufacturer entered the market

Categorizations
Settlements for drugs for
which
the
generic
manufacturer entered the
market before the patent
expired.
The generic manufacturer
entered the market before the
settlement date.
The generic manufacturer
entered the market on the
date when the patent expired.
The generic drug had been
approved by the FDA by the
date of settlement, but the
generic manufacturer could
not enter the market because
the relevant patents had not
expired.
No therapeutically equivalent
generic drug was available on
the date of settlement.

Coding
E

ES
P
A

N

The second independent variable was obtained by categorizing estimated
payments into three groups by comparing them to the average patent litigation
costs in the pharmaceutical industry. We took the figures from Carrier’s paper,
which showed that the range of Hatch–Waxman litigation costs was $2.65–$6
million.85 We set $2 million as the threshold for the comparison with the estimated
reverse payment and denoted “Payment Category” as the estimated payment
category in the dataset. Estimated reverse payments greater than $2 million were
coded as L for “large,” those that were less than $2 million were coded as S for
“small,” and those for which the generic manufacturer entered the market before

85.

Carrier, supra note 69, at 20.
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the relevant patent expired were coded as I for “impossible” because no reverse
payment could occur in such a situation.
E. Description of the Data and Preliminary Observations
The 162 ANDA patent litigation settlements were all quantified and categorized
with the same dependent variable. Table 2 and Figures 1 and 2 summarize the
numerical data. If all the generic manufacturers had been successful in their patent
invalidation suits, over half the generic drugs would have been delayed for at least
eight years before the last qualifying patent expired. The most frequent delays were
five years (23 settlements) and thirteen years (26 settlements).

Table 2. Numerical data summary

YoD
Minimum
1st quartile
Median
Mean
3rd quartile
Maximum

−15
4
8
7.631
13
18

Estimated
Payment ($)
0
188,282
1,032,255
10,735,946
3,048,248
398,100,000

Figure 1. Possible YoD
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If all the brand-name manufacturers made reverse payments after they had
settled, more than half of the estimated reverse payments would be approximately
$1 million, which is less than the average related patent litigation cost. Thus,
although more than half of the generic drugs may have been delayed due to
settlements, the companies would have been justified in settling because the
reverse payments were lower than the litigation costs.

Figure 2. Estimated reverse payments
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Two major findings emerged from the categorical data (Table 3). First, for almost
half of the settlements, no therapeutically equivalent generic drug was available on
the settlement date. Thus, even if the patents had been invalidated, consumers
would still not have had access to a generic drug.
Second, 92% of settlements that were challenged by antitrust agencies had early
generic manufacturer entry into the market. This result indicates that antitrust
agencies may not be overly concerned about the status of generic manufacturer
entry into the market when investigating pay-for-delay settlements.
Table 3. Generic manufacturer entry status

Finally, more than half of the actual or estimated reverse payments were smaller
than the average related patent litigation costs. Therefore, these settlements could
have justifiably been made to avoid being challenged (Table 4).
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Table 4. Reverse payment amount compared to litigation costs

III. DECISION TREE ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

A. Decision Tree Analysis
Decision trees are a type of predictive model that utilizes observations to make
conclusions about the target value of a process. In the tree structure, “leaves”
represent classifications (also known as “labels”), non-leaf “nodes” represent
features, and “branches” represent conjunctions of features that lead to
classifications.86 We used the decision tree method to determine actions that
antirust agencies might take to scrutinize pay-for-delay settlements. Moreover,
pharmaceutical manufacturers can also use the decision tree method proposed in
this study to predict which pay-for-delay settlements will be challenged.

86. Khaled Alsabti, Sanjay Ranka & Vineet Singh, CLOUDS: A Decision Tree Classifier for Large Datasets,
(Aug. 1998), https://www.aaai.org/Papers/KDD/1998/KDD98-001.pdf.
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B. Results
After developing the datasets, we programmed our model in R using both
versions of the datasets and by applying the Gini Index87 and entropy criteria.88 The
results of the model generally included two parts: the decision tree and its
performances. The decision tree is a visual representation of the classification table.
The performance of the model includes three measures: classification table,
accuracy and hit rate. The classification table illustrates the detailed results of the
decision tree and is used to determine whether the algorithm made any
categorization errors. The accuracy and the hit rate are correlated. While the
accuracy shows the results of the correct categorization of both N-type and Y-type
settlements, the hit rate specifically looks at the accuracy of the categorization of
Y-type settlements in the classification table. The hit rate number is important
because it tells us the accuracy of this model being used for evaluating when a payfor-delay settlement might be challenged by the antitrust agencies. Finally, because
the results under Gini Index and entropy criteria are similar, we chose the results
under Gini index to be illustrated in this paper.

Version 1: Numerical Analysis
Two major findings emerged from our analysis (see Figure 3). First, settlements
with estimated reverse payments of less than $24 million will likely not be
challenged by antitrust agencies in the future. Second, YoD did not affect antitrust
agencies’ decisions regarding whether to challenge a settlement.

87. See Laura E. Raileanu & Killian Stoffel, Theoretical Comparison between the Gini Index and Information
Gain
Criteria
(2004),
https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.57.9764&rep=rep1&type=pdf (providing a more
in-depth introduction).
88. See CLAUDE SAMMUT & GEOFFREY I. WEBB, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MACHINE LEARNING AND DATA MINING, (Claude
Sammut & Geoffrey I. Webb eds., 2d ed. 2017) (providing an introduction to entropy). An introduction to
entropy is addressed in Fürnkranz J. Decision Tree. In: Sammut C., Webb G.I. (eds) Encyclopedia of Machine
Learning. Springer, Boston, MA (2011). Available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-30164-8_204.
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Figure 3. Numerical data decision tree

As to the performance in Table 5, the decision tree correctly categorized almost
all N- and Y-type settlements. Only 1 N-type settlement and 1 Y-type settlement
were wrongfully categorized. Moreover, by calculating the accuracy of the decision
tree, we got 0.987. This number suggests that, by having $24 million as the standard
to categorize the numerical data, the accuracy of the categorization is 98%. Finally,
the hit rate of the Version 1 model is 0.923. This number suggests that, if we use
$24 million as a standard for our numerical data to categorize whether they are
exactly Y-type settlements, the accuracy of the categorization is 92.3%.

Table 5. Version 1 classification table
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Version 2: Categorical Analysis
Version 2 also produced two major findings (see Figure 4). First, antitrust
agencies did not challenge A-, ES-, and N-type settlements. For E- and P-type
settlements, S-type reverse payments were not challenged, but L-type payments
were. Second, no predictions were made regarding the I-type settlements because
none of them fell into the Y category (Table 4).

Figure 4. Categorical data decision tree

In terms of the performance, Table 6 reveals that Version 2 of the decision tree
also correctly categorized almost all of the N- and Y-type settlements. Only 2 N-type
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settlements and 1 Y-type settlement were erroneously categorized. By calculating
the accuracy of the decision tree, we got 0.981. This number suggests that by
classifying the categorical data with two sequential thresholds—whether the
generic manufacturer enters the market with A-, ES-, and N-type settlements, and
whether the amount of reverse payment in E- and P-type settlements are less than
$2 million in litigation costs—the accuracy of the categorization is 98%. Finally, the
hit rate of the Version 2 model is also 0.923. This number reveals that, if we use
those two sequential thresholds as a standard for our categorical data to categorize
whether they are exactly Y-type settlements, the accuracy of the categorization is
92.3%.
Table 6. Version 2 classification table

C. Implications And Proposal
In this section, we answer our research question of when antitrust agencies will
challenge a pay-for-delay settlement under Actavis and address a proposal for
pharmaceutical manufacturers to avoid being challenged when making pay-fordelay settlements.
A. Pay-for-delay settlements with payments of more than $24 million are
likely to be challenged, even if the generic manufacturers enter the
market before the last qualifying patent expires.
Since the hit rate of Versions 1 and 2 decision trees are the same, we can
summarize the findings from those two versions of the decision trees. Version 1
decision tree showed that payments greater than $24 million may have antitrust
implications. Moreover, Version 2 showed how to use the status of a generic
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manufacturer’s entry into the market to classify a payment as unjustified. The
payments in settlements in which the status of the generic manufacturer’s entry
into the market are E- and P-types may still be seen as unjustified. Combined with
the points made in the preceding discussion, this value can be used as a threshold
for determining whether further antitrust scrutiny is warranted. Thus, payments
greater than $24 million for settlements with generic manufacturer market entry
statuses that are E- and P-types may be considered large and unjustified and can
therefore be challenged by antitrust agencies.
B.

A proposal to pharmaceutical manufacturers

The results of the Version 1 and Version 2 decision tree analyses have
implications for pharmaceutical companies that have settled or will settle patent
litigation suits.
The Version 1 decision tree result indicates that pay-for-delay settlement
payments that are less than $24 million are less likely to attract antitrust scrutiny
than payments of more than $24 million. Therefore, manufacturers should be wary
of making payments of more than $24 million.
Manufacturers should also examine the generic manufacturer market entry
status and payment amount to determine what type of settlement would best help
them avoid antitrust scrutiny. Specifically, pay-for-delay settlements worth less
than $24 million are less likely to attract antitrust scrutiny if they meet any of the
following criteria: the generic manufacturer enters the market before the date of
the settlement, or the generic drug has been approved by the FDA, but its
manufacturer cannot enter the market because relevant patents have not expired,
or there is no therapeutically equivalent generic drug available on the date of
settlement.
IV.CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS OF THIS PAPER

This paper uses two decision tree models to clarify when the antitrust agencies
might challenge a given pay-for-delay settlement under Actavis. Version 1 indicated
that antitrust agencies would be more likely to investigate payments of more than
$24 million. Version 2 addressed how the status of generic manufacturer entry into
the market affects the probability of a settlement attracting antitrust scrutiny. The
results of both decision tree analyses can be used by pharmaceutical manufacturers
to determine whether they can settle a pay-for-delay without the risk of being
investigated by the antitrust agencies.
Although this paper can help pharmaceutical manufacturers evaluate the risks
of being challenged for pay-for-delay settlements, we acknowledge that this study
has several limitations. First, because there is no database of pay-for-delay
settlements, and only a few settlements were challenged by antitrust agencies, the
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amount of the data we collected is limited. We obtained only 162 available data for
conducting the decision tree analysis. Thus, if we can collect more data of pay-fordelay settlements in the future, the results of the decision tree analysis could be
optimized and tested. Second, the details of the pay-for-delay settlements will
never be disclosed, unless they are litigated in the federal courts. Due to this
limitation of disclosure, we can only assume that all N-type settlements in our
dataset have cash payments in their settlements, even if some of them may in fact
have no-cash payment. Third, since there is no open-free database of litigation costs
for ANDA patent litigations, we can adopt only historical data from literature to
compare with the estimated reverse payment in our dataset.
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Appendix

Table 1: Federal Courts of Appeal cases related to pay-for-delay agreements
(Citations Omitted)
List of Case Names and Years

Framework of analysis

King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Smithkline
Beecham Corp. (2015)

The Actavis’s five lessons and rule-of-reason
analysis.

In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litigation. (2016)

The Actavis’s five lessons and rule-of-reason
analysis.
The Actavis’s five lessons and rule-of-reason
analysis.

In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation Indirect
Purchaser Class (2017)
In re Lipitor Antitrust Litigation. (2017)

24

The Actavis’s five lessons and rule-of-reason
analysis.
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Table 2: District and state-level cases related to pay-for-delay agreements
(Citation Omitted)
List of Case Name and Year

Framework of analysis

United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1776 v.
Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2014)

The Actavis’s five lessons and rule-of-reason
analysis.

FTC v. Cephalon, Inc. (E.D. Pa. 2014)

The Actavis’s five lessons and rule-of-reason
analysis.

Time Ins. Co. v. Astrazeneca AB (E.D. Pa. 2014)

The Actavis’s five lessons and rule-of-reason
analysis.

F.T.C. v. AbbVie Inc. (E.D. Pa. 2015)

The Actavis’s five lessons and rule-of-reason
analysis.
The Actavis’s five lessons and rule-of-reason
analysis.
Addressed the elements that plaintiffs must prove
are present in a pay-for-delay agreement.

In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litigation (D. Conn. 2015)
In re Cipro Cases I & II (Cal. 2015)
In re Solodyn (Minocycline Hydrochloride) Antitrust
Litigation (D. Mass. 2015)

The Actavis’s five lessons and rule-of-reason
analysis.

In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation (D.N.J. 2016)

Addressed the elements that plaintiffs must prove
are present in a pay-for-delay agreement.

In re Asacol Antitrust Litigation (D. Mass. 2017)

The Actavis’s five lessons and rule-of-reason
analysis

In re Namenda Direct Purchaser Antitrust
Litigation (S.D.N.Y. 2017)

The Actavis’s five lessons and rule-of-reason
analysis

Picone v. Shire PLC (D. Mass. 2017)
In re Zetia (Ezetimibe) Antitrust Litigation (E.D.
Va. 2019)

The Actavis’s five lessons and rule-of-reason
analysis
The Actavis’s five lessons and rule-of-reason
analysis

In the Matter of Impax Laboratories, Inc. (F.T.C.
2018)

The Actavis’s five lessons and rule-of-reason
analysis
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